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The question of how to structure and package the residential
experience is a deeply interesting and difficult one. How physically large
or small should residential holdings be? How densely should they be
clustered? Should spaces for working, recreating, cooking, and bathing
be contained within the private residential unit, shared with other
households, or procured á la carte? How permanent should the
connection be between a household and a living space? How much
control should households have over the environment surrounding the
dwelling unit? Answers to these and many other queries differ both
within and between societies. Housing services can be provided in an
1

almost infinite array of configurations, from capsule hotels to large
estate homes situated on extensive private grounds.
A law and economics perspective that fully attends to problems of
scale can inform the task of configuring residential property optimally.
Like other forms of private property, housing entitlements mark off
resources from the rest of the world and delegate broad decisionmaking
2

power over them to individuals and groups. Deciding how thickly or
thinly to carve up housing resembles other boundary-drawing problems,
3

such as determining the optimal scope of a firm or a farm. In each case,

1 Capsule hotels provide a small plastic pod (roughly 6 ½ feet long by 5 feet wide) for

an individual to sleep in, along with lockers for belongings, and communal bathing
and eating facilities. Although the hotels' primary clientele was initially businessmen
who had missed their last train home, these hotels began to be used during the
recession by long-term guests who rented by the month. Hiroko Tabuchi, For Some in
Japan, Home Is a Tiny Plastic Bunk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A1.
2 Henry Smith has associated property rule protection and strong exclusion rights with
broad delegations to owners. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules
in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 974, 978-85 (2004) [hereinafter Smith,
Exclusion]; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719,
1755-64 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules].
3 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-34 (1993)
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the appropriate size and composition of the holding depends on the scale
of the underlying activities.

4

Identifying the relevant scale for

residential activity is not easy, however. Housing serves a number of
5

distinct goals, and it can be delivered through a variety of property
formats.

6

It also plays a crucial role in rationing access to other

important goods and services, including education and public safety. An
analytic perspective that emphasizes scale illuminates the ways in which
law intersects with private decisionmaking to deliver housing. Central to
this analysis is the mutability of the functions served by housing. The
law, as part of a generative process that interacts with private markets
and household decisions, can profoundly influence what happens inside
and outside the envelope of the home.

(describing the challenge of setting “efficient boundaries” and the attendant tradeoffs
between “internal management” and “external coordination”); Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (papers and proceedings)
347, 358 (1967) (“The greater are diseconomies of scale to land ownership the more
will contractual arrangement be used by the interacting neighbors to settle [their]
differences.”); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, N.S. 386
(1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33, 44
(1988) (discussing efficient boundaries for a firm).
4 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1322-35.
5 There is a burgeoning literature on this point. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as
a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist
Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 53049 (2007); LORNA FOX, CONCEPTUALIZING HOME: THEORIES, LAWS AND POLICIES
142-77 (2007).
6 These possibilities are often cast in terms of a limited slate of recognized tenure forms,
such as the leasehold, the life estate, and the fee simple. This limited menu, and the
numerus clausus principle it embodies, has been the focus of a great deal of scholarly
attention. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE
L.J. 1 (2000); Nestor Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008).
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This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I considers a variety of
dimensions along which housing packages can vary and notes the ways
in which the law may restrict or burden particular configurations. Part II
examines how a home’s physical, spatial, and conceptual boundaries
might be optimized, posing questions analogous to those that Ronald
Coase asked about firms and that Robert Ellickson and Harold Demsetz
7

asked about property holdings more generally.

I. Housing Packages
At its most essential, a home is a vehicle for delivering a
specialized stream of consumption benefits to its occupants.

8

Arrangements that fit within the usual meaning of “home” give a
9

household a variety of temporally extended rights, good against the rest
of the world, to a physical structure that affords some measure of shelter,
7 See Coase, supra note 3 (addressing firm boundaries). Robert Ellickson, following

Harold Demsetz, translated Coase’s question about firm boundaries explicitly into the
property realm by asking about the appropriate physical and conceptual boundaries of
land holdings. Ellickson, supra note 3; see Demsetz supra note 3. Ellickson later
engaged in a detailed economic analysis of households that, together with the earlier
analysis of property in land, informs the analysis here. See generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008); Robert
C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth,
116 YALE L.J. 226 (2006).
8 The home may also deliver investment returns to its occupants, depending on tenure
form. See infra Part I.C.2.
9 A household might be an individual, a family unit, or any other small and relatively
stable grouping that elects to regularly share housing and perhaps meals. Robert
Ellickson offers a definition that shifts attention from the occupants themselves to the
arrangements they have made with each other. See Ellickson, supra note 7, at 230
(“ ‘household’ is a set of institutional arrangements, formal or informal, that governs
relations among the owners and occupants of a dwelling space where occupants
usually sleep and share meals”).
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security, and privacy.

10

For example, the occupying household

11

generally has the right to enter and leave the structure at times of its
choosing, to control who else enters the structure and what they do while
there, to store and display objects within the structure, and to engage in
any of a fairly broad and unspecified set of uses in and immediately
around the structure without first having to seek any outsider’s
approval.

12

The home also serves as a physically tethered delivery

portal for additional consumption streams that emanate from outside the
property’s boundaries, including local public goods and services, and all
the other benefits (and detriments) associated with a particular spatial
location.

13

Typically, the occupants will also have some formal or

informal rights over externality-generating uses that others might make
14

of nearby properties.

10 See, e.g., Barros, supra note 5, at 259-75 (discussing elements of “security, liberty,

and privacy” in the home).
11 Some complications are suppressed here by referring to “the occupying household” as

if it were a monolith. Internal rules or other governance mechanisms commonly
operate within the household to extend or withdraw certain rights to certain household
members and to manage their use of the common areas. See Ellickson, supra note 7,
at 297-323 (analyzing a broad array of such mechanisms for governing relationships
among co-occupants).
12 Property ownership has been associated with a large and unspecified set of uses. See,
e.g., Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 2, at 1759-60 (noting the many
unspecified ways that an owner can use a house); see also J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY
AND JUSTICE 65 (1996) (emphasizing the “countless” ways an owner is entitled to
“use, abuse, exploit, or transmit” property). While the choice set open to a leaseholder
may be smaller than that afforded a homeowner, the same principle applies insofar as
many uses can be selected without having to obtain preapproval.
13 The Tiebout Hypothesis stands for the idea that residents select bundles of local goods
and services by choosing where to locate. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 25-44 (2009)
(examining the bundled package that comprises the home, including many elements
that lie outside the physical structure or parcel).
14 Common law nuisance principles allow owners to enjoin or receive damages for
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Despite these commonalities, housing entitlements vary widely.
What ends up inside or outside a given housing bundle depends on a
complex interplay between legal restrictions, market forces, and
household responses. I will start by considering the various dimensions
of housing bundles, and the many ways in which law may restrict their
content and configuration.
A. Quantitative Dimensions
As an initial cut, property holdings can be defined by reference to
their size in space and their length in time. Law frequently regulates both
dimensions in the housing context.
1. Space
Real property exists in space and is intuitively defined by its size
and shape. Legal systems regulate and impact spatial configurations in
many ways. The shape of property holdings can depend on the way in
15

which land is demarcated,

and on the way in which vertical space is
16

attached to or detached from surface rights.

The law also frequently

sets spatial requirements for residential property. For example, many
municipal zoning ordinances and private neighborhood covenants
specify that homes must sit on lots of a certain minimum size. Cities also

certain kinds of impact-causing uses, while finer-grained land use controls like zoning
and covenants may add many more limits.
15 See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2011).
16 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL
AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008) (tracing the interaction between
the ad coelum doctrine and the demands of air travel); Ellickson, supra note 3, at
1363-64 (describing “vertical boundaries” for property holdings).
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17

set minimum square footages for rental units.

Building codes that

require ceilings of a certain height or laws that require ownership of
surface rights to be bundled with sufficient underground support set
minima in vertical space.
Some regulations influence space indirectly. Housing codes and fire
codes that specify the maximum occupancy for a given space have the
effect of requiring a minimum amount of space for each household of a
given size. Limits on use can also preclude spatial subdivision. Thus, in
an area zoned for single family homes, it is impermissible to subdivide a
house and sell separate portions to different families. Spatial maxima
might also be specified. For example, homeowners fed up with
“McMansions” have been successful in imposing size limits for
18

dwellings in some communities, typically tied to lot size.

Measures to

limit home energy usage that are tied to housing size, like the one in
19

Boulder County, Colorado, effectively place a tax on larger homes.

17 A surge of recent interest in small housing units has led to reexamination of some

such minima. See Venessa Wong, Will the Middle Class Want Micro-Apartments?
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/printer/
articles/92394-will-the-middle-class-want-micro-apartments (reporting on the recent
reduction in the minimum size of apartments in San Francisco from 290 square feet to
220 square feet); id. (noting that the minimum apartment size of 400 square feet has
been waived in New York City to allow for construction of the winning development
in Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s recent micro-apartment design competition); see also
Tom Orlik & Esther Fung, In China, a Move to Tiny Living Space, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2012 (reporting on a Dongguan developer’s model apartment that “measures 160
square feet, about the size of a parking space”).
18 These restrictions, unlike the environmentally motivated measures discussed infra, are
generally designed to keep owners from erecting a house that is deemed too large for
its lot rather than to restrict size as an absolute matter. Because owners would not be
precluded from building larger houses if they bought more land to build it on, these
restrictions could be characterized as imposing (lot size) spatial minima rather than
(square footage) spatial maxima.
19 See Allyson Wendt, Boulder County Limits Energy Use for Homes, ENVIRONMENTAL
BUILDING NEWS (May 1, 2008), http://www.buildinggreen.com/auth/article.cfm/2008/
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As these examples suggest, spatial requirements may be imposed to
solve collective action problems of various sorts. Local public goods like
“a compact, walkable neighborhood” or “a neighborhood with a
spacious, open feel” may be achieved by restricting spatial
configurations. Other explanations for mandated lot or home sizes have
nothing to do with space as such. For example, spatial minima might be
applied to screen on wealth or to ensure a certain property tax
20

contribution.

Such restrictions may push housing to a physical scale

that impedes the production of local public goods such as a dense and
walkable neighborhood, or, at a larger scale, a metropolitan area that is
compact to traverse.
In other instances, spatial restrictions may be designed to head off
trouble down the road. For example, Michael Heller has suggested that
legally mandated spatial minima can forestall the difficult bargaining
problems that might result from later attempts to aggregate
21

entitlements.

Similarly, spatial minima, coupled with certain limits on

uses at the property edges, might minimize future conflicts over crossborder spillovers. Put a different way, and following a geometric point
22

that has been made about fencing,

physically large property holdings

economize on edges, which are the membranes through which

4/29/Boulder-County-Limits-Energy-Use-for-Homes/ (describing the Boulder County
BuildSmart program and the City of Boulder’s Green Points program). Boulder
subsequently amended the program to make it less stringent.
20 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2005) (discussing and citing literature on possible motivations for
zoning measures that have the effect of excluding low- and moderate-income
households).
21 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1173 (1999).
22 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1332.
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externalities spill out—and in.
Conversely, legally prescribed spatial maxima may reflect a
concern for not “overdrawing” a common supply of available land (or
associated resources), where a viable pricing mechanism does not exist,
or is not employed for distributive reasons. Spatial maxima might also
be imposed indirectly, as through “use it or lose it” doctrines that are
costly to satisfy for large holdings. Legal rules or enforcement practices
that enable squatters to occupy unmonitored land may similarly have the
effect of making large holdings more costly to retain, while at the same
time carving out new residential holdings from existing property
23

bundles.

2. Time
Property is, by its nature, an enduring institution. The fee simple
absolute, the most complete of the estates in land, extends forward
indefinitely. Making property more expansive in time serves much the
same purpose as making it more expansive in space: externalities are
internalized as owners trade off the current and future benefits of
24

particular actions.

Yet temporal scaling can be as important as spatial

scaling to optimizing the use of property, especially where residential
purposes are contemplated. Leaseholds consciously slice off temporally
bounded property rights and alienate them to possessors. Similarly, free

23 See Modder East Squatters & Others v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (8)

BCLR 821 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (holding that 40,000 illegal occupiers living in thousands
of informal dwellings on about 50 hectares of a landowner’s property could not be
displaced until the government provided alternative property for them, but ordering
compensation for the landowner) discussed in Gregory S. Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 786-91 (2009).
24 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 3, at 355; Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1364-71.
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alienability of housing allows owners to temporally tailor their property
rights to fit their selected length of use, simply by lopping off the
unneeded future portion and transferring it to someone else.
Land use controls can place limits on temporal as well as spatial
configurations. For example, owners may face restrictions or
25

prohibitions on leasing out their homes.

While such measures do not

explicitly specify temporal minima—owners remain free to sell their
properties outright—they do have the practical effect of extending
ownership in time given the costs associated with completing a sales
transaction. A flat ban on the alienability of property would preclude
formal temporal slicing altogether, although the limited life spans of
human beings would effectively accomplish a rough form of slicing.
Where limited periods of possession can be transferred through leases,
the law may dictate certain temporal minima or maxima, and may even
specify that only the tenant, and not her landlord, may later truncate that
26

time span.

B. Qualitative Dimensions
The extent of a property interest depends not only on its physical
25 See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to

Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 46-61 (2009)
(describing a variety of rental restrictions implemented by local governments and
private developers, including municipal bans on short-term rentals in vacation
destinations); Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community
Associations: Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
223, 224 (2009) (noting prevalence of restrictions on leasing in common interest
communities).
26 Rent control ordinances take this basic form by requiring that tenants be given an
entitlement to remain indefinitely, subject only to limited exceptions and to the
tenant’s own decision to leave. In other words, the law requires that both an openended time span and the means with which to cut it short be conveyed together to the
leaseholder.
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size and temporal length, but also on what it permits, forbids, or requires
the owners or occupants to do.
1. Use Restrictions
In nearly all sizable U.S. cities, zoning constrains the range of
27

permissible uses.

In the residential context, zoning can operate with

great specificity. Separate zones might be established, for example, for
single family homes on half-acre lots, single family homes on smaller
lots, duplexes, triplexes, small apartment buildings, and large apartment
complexes. There are often fairly rigid limits on what ancillary uses may
be made of property that is zoned residential, with home businesses and
accessory dwellings like garage apartments often presenting difficult
boundary issues.
As Peter Colwell has observed, functional rights in land use interact
in interesting ways with choices about the spatial extent of property
rights. More uses can be permitted the larger the area under the control
of a single owner, at least as long as edges can be managed
28

appropriately.

It is interesting, then, that zoning often couples tight use

controls with spatial minima that seem to be in excess of what
29

individuals would demand if left to their own devices.

Meanwhile,

27 Houston, Texas remains the notable exception.
28 Peter Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL

ESTATE ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997) (“Another alternative [to zoning] would be to
allow developers to do anything they want as long as they have some minimum scale,
for example 640 acres, and as long as they do certain things at the edges of their
developments (e.g., build very tall berms). Since the developers would internalize
most of the externalities produced, their internal zoning could be expected to
approach the optimal zoning.”).
29 The distortionary effects of spatial minima, especially in the context of large lot sizes,
have received attention. See, e.g., Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s Steep
Price, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 24; ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS
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tight use controls make it more difficult for any excess spatial capacity to
be used productively.
A similar point might be made about temporally extended property
interests. As the law of waste suggests, stricter functional limits must be
placed on temporally limited estates, such as life estates, to keep current
possessors from offloading costs onto later possessors. Making holdings
larger in time and space does not resolve all issues about uses, but it does
tend to privatize the management of those issues.
2. Minimum Standards
While use restrictions chip away at what an owner may do, other
legal restrictions mandate what an owner must do. Such restrictions are
prevalent in the housing context, whether prompted by externalities,
paternalism, or concerns about bargaining imbalances, information
asymmetries, or cognitive biases. Housing codes as well as the implied
warranty of habitability set minimum quality standards for rental
housing. Owner occupied properties are also subject to code
requirements that specify standards for electrical and plumbing systems
and that demand other sorts of upkeep and maintenance. Zoning
restrictions and private residential covenants may require compliance
with certain aesthetic standards in matters of exterior decoration, lawn
care, fencing, and so on.
Some housing restrictions might be aimed at producing network
effects across neighborhoods or communities that parties acting
independently would have difficulty producing. This rationale has been

AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 185-88 (2005) (citing and
discussing the findings of Glaeser & Gyourko).
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offered, for example, in the context of accessibility features for people
with disabilities: a world in which all properties are accessible is a very
different one to navigate than a world in which accessibility is hit or
miss, and there may well be nonlinearities associated with reaching
certain thresholds of widespread accessibility.

30

Other aspects of

housing law, such as rent control, might be directed at preserving
31

community networks against the threat of dispersion.
C. Risk and Returns

Housing packages vary not only along the quantitative and
qualitative dimensions just mentioned, but also in their allocation of
risks and returns.
1. Reconfiguration and Transfer Surplus
Property in housing, like other forms of property, changes hands. If
the transaction is an efficient one, the property is more valuable in the
32

new hands than it was in the old hands.

Who will get the associated

surplus? In the case of ordinary market transactions involving fee
interests, negotiation will determine the division of the gains from trade,
30 See David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI.

LEGAL F. 47, 98 (noting the possibility that private architectural choices regarding
accessibility could have network effects); Robin Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design:
Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2009) (arguing
for “inclusive design standards” for single-family homes).
31 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350,
369 (1986) (discussing this rationale for rent control).
32 On the other hand, the transfer might be inefficient, with the property ending up in the
hands of a lower-valuing user. This result might occur if nonmarket processes (like
eminent domain) were used to accomplish an involuntary shift that did not account for
the takee’s full value in the holding. It could also occur through market processes due
to factors like information asymmetries, cognitive biases, or liquidity problems. In
such cases, there would be no surplus from the transfer, and the question becomes one
of who will bear the loss.
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based on the negotiating skills and outside options of the parties.
Not all transfers involve selling an entire fee interest outright. For
example, owners can produce property in housing by subdividing larger
fee interests into shorter-or longer-term leases or life estates. The surplus
thereby produced will be divided in market-mediated or legally
prescribed ways. For example, if a leasehold is inalienable, the tenant
will not be able to enjoy any gains that might be produced by creating
33

and conveying yet smaller time slices.

Nor does the tenant typically

have any claim on surplus produced at the end of the leasehold, when
possession is transferred to someone else. In the case of an ordinary
leasehold, then, the tenure form dictates the later division of surplus.
Similarly, property (currently) in housing may be aggregated to
produce surplus. If holdout problems impede efforts at aggregation,
34

eminent domain may be employed to overcome the deadlock.

Where

only fair market value is paid to the homeowners, the surplus from the
aggregation (the assembly premium), goes entirely to the government or
to the party to whom the property is reconveyed (depending on the terms
35

of the reconveyance).

Eminent domain might also be used to move

33 The statement in the text assumes that the parties will comply with the legal

restriction, which may not always be the case.
34 The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits eminent domain to takings for

public use, which rules out purely private transfers from A to B. Nonetheless, a site
can be condemned for redevelopment and transferred to another private party where
this will serve a public purpose. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005).
35 This assumes that fair market value is below the landowner’s reservation price—a
reasonable assumption for any landowner who does not already have the property on
the market. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 859, 866 (noting that owners’ consumer surplus in condemnation cases
“has to be positive, for otherwise owners would already have sold their holdings on
the market.”).
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residential property from one party to another, even where no assembly
36

is required.

In this case, as with land assembly, the surplus would go

the condemning authority or to those to whom it retransfers.
Changes in the uses to which property can be put may also produce
surpluses, relative to the existing baseline. For example, a parcel of land
that is zoned residential may become much more valuable if it is rezoned
for commercial use. Because zoning is not sold on the open market, the
division of surplus will depend on the set of monetary and nonmonetary
expenditures necessary to bring about the zoning change, as well as on
37

the incidence of any externalities generated by the change.
2. Investment Risk

In addition to serving as occasions for dividing up surplus, transfers
serve as trigger points for realizing market gains and losses on housing
investments. The issues are related but distinct: surplus division goes to
the relationship between the parties’ reservation prices and their payoffs
in the present transaction, while investment gains and losses go to the
relationship between the sales price in the current transaction and the
acquisition price in the previous transaction. It is entirely possible for a
homeowner to enjoy an investment gain while garnering none of the
38

surplus from a transfer,

or to suffer an investment loss but nonetheless

36 Again, this might be done to get around “thin market” problems and associated

monopoly dynamics. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 76 (1986).
37 For a discussion of how dealmaking over land use rights differs from market
exchange, see, e.g., BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 182-85 (2005).
38 For example, an eminent domain proceeding might deliver none of the assembly or
transfer surplus to the owner of the condemned property (and indeed might not even
produce surplus at all), but could nonetheless return to the owner a gain on her
investment in the home, relative to what she paid for it.
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obtain surplus from a transfer.

Like chances at surplus, investment risk

is almost invariably bundled with freeholds and virtually never bundled
with leaseholds. But things need not operate this way, and there have
been a number of proposals that would rearrange risk, whether by
subtracting appreciation potential, downside risk, or both, from
40

homeowners’ bundles,

or adding an investment stake to the holdings

41

of renters.

3. Losses Due to Appropriation and Legal Change
Property may be appropriated by governmental bodies or may lose
value as a result of legal change. Moreover, depending on legal
restrictions as well as enforcement levels and penalties, property may be
42

subject to appropriation or devaluation by other private actors.

An

39 This could occur when local economic conditions cause the home’s market value to

decline, but also cause the home’s value to the Sellers to decline even more (if, for
example, they have lost employment in the area and must move elsewhere to find a
job). Thus, the Buyers may currently value the home more than the Sellers do, but less
than the Sellers valued the home in the previous transaction under different market
conditions.
40 For discussion of existing and proposed models, see generally Lee Anne Fennell,
Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008).
41 See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood
Improvement while Protecting Low-Income Families 2-3 (Urban Institute Opportunity
and Ownership Project No. 8, 2007), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/
311457.html (proposing financial options indexed to area rents be made available to
tenants); O’FLAHERTY, supra note 37, at 369 (“Tenants could get a long-run stake in
the community if they were required to buy some variety of security that was pegged
to the town’s or neighborhood’s total property value.”); see also Lee Anne Fennell &
Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (2010) (examining
how local governments might be involved in implementing such proposals).
42 Consider here adverse possession, prescriptive easements, and statutory mechanisms
for condemning private rights of way for accessing landlocked parcels. In addition to
these legally approved mechanisms for transferring property, unapproved transfers
may occur due to the lack of enforcement. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Exchange
and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 17-18 (1964).
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important question, which crops up with special salience in the housing
context, is who should bear the associated risks. Where eminent domain
is employed and compensation is full, the community as a whole covers
the risk to a homeowner.

43

Where eminent domain systematically

undercompensates homeowners, the risk is shared: the household bears
the risk of losing the difference between the compensation amount and
her reservation price, but the community insures against the taking up to
the amount of compensation paid. Owners bear the risk of
uncompensated appropriations and of many legal changes that reduce
44

property value,

except to the extent that private arrangements with
45

third parties buffer this risk.

43 Thus, as has been well noted, takings compensation operates as a form of insurance

against legal change. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry
Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q. J. Econ. 71
(1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269 (1988).
44 The law surrounding regulatory takings is a complex mix of per se and balancing
rules. Regulations that work even a trivial permanent physical occupation are always
considered compensable takings. Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Likewise, an elimination of all economically viable use that is not a function of
background limitations on title will always be a compensable taking. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Regulations that impact property but
do not fit within these per se rules are subject to Penn Central’s multi-factor analysis
and may or may not be takings that require just compensation. Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Lingle v. Chevron,
544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (reiterating the Penn Central factors).
45 The possibility of private takings insurance has been discussed in the academic
literature. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just
Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 499-521 (2003); Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A
Torts Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1238-47, 1270-72
(1994); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 527-28, 537-49, 602-06 (1986). There is also an implicit form of insurance in
place where a lender (and hence the pool of other creditors) will effectively bear part
of the loss associated with a large drop in value.
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The law can also heighten or reduce the risk of private
appropriation (as through trespass and nuisance) by selecting
enforcement levels and penalties. Owners must bear the risk of
unremediated private appropriations, or obtain private insurance to cover
those risks.
4. Other Dispossession Risks
The risk of dispossession looms large in housing policy. Aside from
the forms of appropriation discussed above, households may be forced to
move due to a foreclosure, eviction, or rent increase. The law manages
these risks in a variety of ways, often by directly constricting the ability
of parties to engage in certain kinds of transactions. For example, rent
control statutes confer (with some exceptions) unlimited tenure at
controlled rental amounts, and these protections are not waivable. Limits
on credit or on the availability of foreclosure similarly reduce the risk of
dispossession that households can take on. All such measures, by
reducing the control that parties other than the occupants have over the
length of the housing stay, help to confer a valuable option to remain—
an option that arguably is the single most important element in
46

constructing what is meant by “home.”

But like other measures that

enrich housing packages, protections against dispossession carry
potential downsides in the form of reduced access to housing in the first
place.

46 See Lee Anne Fennell, Possession Puzzles, in 11-1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

WFL10-1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2010) (discussing the significance of the
possessory option). On the importance of the right to remain, see Radin, supra note 31,
at 359-63, 368-70; Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law
Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 817, 820-29 (2008).
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D. Complementarities and Scale
The discussion to this point has emphasized that the home can be
configured in many ways, and that private decisions and legal
restrictions interact to determine the shape and contents of the
entitlement package. Yet we do not see all possible combinations. Some
possibilities (like a too-small rental unit or a too-risky mortgage) may be
outlawed, while other combinations may simply fail to emerge. The
reason we see some packages and not others may implicate
complementarities and indivisibilities—or, to use a more evocative term,
“lumpiness.”

47

For example, a half-constructed house is not half as
48

valuable as a completed house, even if it costs half as much to build.

We might find that other physical and functional characteristics, as well
as certain sets of rights, are strongly complementary in delivering what
counts as a “home,” so that removing any one of them dramatically
reduces the value of the remaining components. Indeed, it is even
47 Lumpy goods do not deliver utility in smoothly increasing increments but rather in

discontinuous jumps. See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and
Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350
(1982); Russell Hardin, Group Provision of Step Goods, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 101 (1976);
Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON.
& PHIL. 245 (1987). The notion of lumpiness can be easily illustrated by a bridge over
a chasm. If the bridge requires ten segments to span the void, the first nine segments
of the bridge deliver no utility at all (except perhaps as unusual urban art). The tenth,
however, suddenly produces a huge step-up in utility. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (citing the standard bridge example but noting its
limits as an illustration of a step good, given that bridges can vary widely in cost and
quality). For further discussion of lumpiness as it applies to property law and theory,
see Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012).
48 Interestingly, this very fact may offer insight into otherwise puzzling patterns of
behavior, including the use of partially completed homes as savings vehicles. See
ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING
OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 183-84 (2011) (explaining that families in
many developing countries invest in home-construction efforts that extend over long
spans of time, and hinting at possible explanations related to precommitment).
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possible to understand certain risk and return packages in this way, if one
supposes that homeownership necessarily requires risking property value
losses and pursuing gains.
Ultimately, the questions are empirical ones. How does utility grow
or shrink as elements are added to or subtracted from housing bundles?
Do nonlinearities make additions or subtractions to the bundle useful
only if made in certain discrete chunks? Answering these questions leads
us to examine why it matters whether some particular element is
included or not included within the household’s ownership envelope. In
important ways, one’s home is constructed not only of the elements
inside the dwelling, but of many other outside impacts and
49

opportunities.

50

Considered in this way, the home is always co-owned.

The larger question to which this essay is addressed, then, is how to
manage that co-ownership.
In the balance of this essay, I will focus on the boundaries of the
household’s property interest in the home. For simplicity, I will refer to
this interest as “the home” despite the fact that the value and the quality
of the housing services the household receives, and the market value of
the home itself, depend crucially on factors lying outside that property
interest. Indeed, that is the point. We must consider the impact of

49 See FENNELL, supra note 13.
50 Armen Alchian makes a similar observation:

[I]f the property laws prohibit me from using things in ways that affect your
welfare, then in a sense you are able to exercise through the law, control over my
decisions as to what use will be made or of the thing of which I was called the
“owner.” Who shall be called the owner? Me, or the rest of society? Isn’t everyone
an owner in some sense or other, insofar as his interests are influenced in affecting
the use to some degree by laws passed (in a democracy)?
ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, SOME ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY 25 (1961).
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extending or constricting the private household’s holdings on
interactions both within the household and between the household and
those outside of it. For example, including a bathroom within a living
unit avoids the need to queue up for a public restroom, and thus lessens
the pressure on those public facilities. At the same time, by making the
living unit more expensive, households may have to include more
members, and this may lead to other problematic internal interactions
across other dimensions.
The next Part works through a theoretical framework for examining
these kinds of tradeoffs.

II. A Theory of the Home
If we were going to construct a theory of the home analogous to
Coase’s theory of the firm, how would we begin? We might start by
considering the relevant scale (in time, space, and use) of the residential
experience, and the sorts of complementary elements required to
produce it. We could then turn to questions of boundary-drawing,
recognizing that an expanded envelope will tend to require more internal
management and less external transacting, and a constricted envelope
will tend to require less internal management and more external
transacting. Placing additional factors within the home provides option
value and flexibility to occupants (for example, the washing machine
can be used at a moment’s notice), but it is also expensive, and presents
an opportunity cost associated with untapped excess capacity.
Subpart A below begins with the question of efficient boundaries,
drawing analogies to the work of Coase on firms and that of Ellickson
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and Demsetz on land holdings. Subpart B addresses the problem of
excess capacity and its alternatives. Subparts C and D consider how
interactions between privately and commonly owned elements, and
between elements owned by different parties, respectively, can generate
potential incentive misalignments for the law to manage.
A. Efficient Boundaries
Before turning to the problem of efficient residential boundaries, it
is helpful to briefly review some of the lessons of efficient boundaries in
other contexts.
1. Of Firms and Farms
Ronald Coase launched an entire field of law and economics by
51

asking a simple question: why are there firms?

If transactions can

always be arranged to procure all needed goods and services in all
necessary combinations, the practice of grouping together certain
elements within the envelope of a firm seems puzzling. The answer
given by Coase and elaborated by scholars thereafter is that sometimes
the costs of internal organization and management are lower than the
costs of external transacting. To the extent (and only to the extent) that
this is the case, firms are efficient.
As Demsetz and Ellickson have shown, analogous points can be
made about the size and scope of property entitlements. To simplify,
property rights draw a circle around a resource and its owner or
52

owners.

This line marks off an interior space and, at the same time,

51 See Coase, supra note 3, at 37 (“Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges

at all in a specialized exchange economy.”).
52 Cf. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (“Property
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creates an outward-facing shell. The concept of property is closely
associated with this outer shell, which (for most purposes) commands
the uninvited to keep off. Thus, Carol Rose has explained that a limited
access commons is “property on the outside” to the extent that outsiders
53

can be excluded.

At the property line, the mode of property protection
54

switches from (mostly) exclusion to governance.

Within the interior

space, common owners (if there are more than one) must determine how
to use the resource. If the owners invite in tenants or employees or
guests or licensees of various sorts, they must manage uses of the
resource by these individuals as well.
Owners face another sort of difficulty if they must interact with
outsiders to achieve their goals for the property. Indeed, property itself
can be understood as a technology for internalizing costs and benefits by
(at least roughly) pairing inputs and outcomes.55 If many inputs must be
gathered from other owners on a regular basis to carry out functions
within the property holding, or if rights to the returns from activities on
the property must be separately negotiated with outsiders in each
instance, property cannot do its job effectively. Optimizing property
holdings, then, requires that the boundary be pushed outward until the
56

costs of dealing with outsiders

53
54
55
56

are just equal to the costs of internally

draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within
that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without.”).
See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S456 (2002).
See Demsetz, supra note 3 (explaining how property rights can internalize externalities
where it is worth the cost of doing so).
I use the phrase “costs of dealing with outsiders” here in place of the usual term
“transaction costs” because the law's protection of property rights are an important
and costly element of this interaction with outsiders. If “transaction costs” are read
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managing the holding.

Deciding where to place the boundary depends

on the scale of the activities that an owner wishes to undertake.
An owner may not select optimal boundaries if she does not
internalize all of the costs and benefits of boundary placement. The
resource management that takes place on the inside of a property holding
is largely privatized, while public enforcement plays a lead role in
enforcing exclusion from the outer boundaries and in otherwise
managing impacts that emanate from outside the property’s edges.
Choosing to expand the property envelope, then, may reduce the need
for costly interactions with outsiders, but it may also mean giving up
what amounts to a public subsidy for those interactions. The placement
of temporal and conceptual boundaries around property holdings
implicates similar efficiency questions. In each case, it is necessary to
examine not only where efficiency would mandate locating the boundary,
but also how implicit or explicit subsidies or penalties imposed by law
can alter the private calculus in ways that correct for or produce
inefficiencies.
Also significant is the fact that property arrangements can rarely, if
ever, be reduced to a single “inside” and “outside.” Packages of
58

ownership are typically nested within each other in complex ways.

broadly enough to include the costs of avoiding unwanted transactions, then the term
would be apt, but not everyone understands the term in this way. See Lee Anne
Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at section I.B.2).
57 Cf. Coase, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining that “a firm will tend to expand until the
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of
carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the
costs of organizing in another firm”).
58 Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 101-02 (1990) (discussing the “nesting” of different levels
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Private property rights appear within collectives. Even in a household or
other shared living context, individuals have their own possessions and
often their own sleeping quarters. At a larger scale, a neighborhood may
share many elements in common, but the homes themselves are privately
owned by individual households. Likewise, collectives appear within
private property holdings. A privately owned home often contains
multiple members who share certain spaces and amenities, and a private
development or private club (or any other “limited access commons”)
will operate like a commons on the inside even as it appears to the outer
world as private property.

59

Many more complexly nested private-

private and collective-collective arrangements exist.
As these examples suggest, privately and commonly held elements
often interact within the same spatial area, and can produce incentive
misalignments. The classic example is Garrett Hardin’s parable of
60

overgrazing herds.

What creates the incentive for herdspeople to add

an inefficient number of cattle to a common grazing land is not simply
the fact that the grazing land is held in common; rather it is the abutment
between the privately owned cattle and the commonly held land.

61

Managing such abutments among ownership types is as central to
property law as is managing the relationships between owners and

of governance).
59 See Rose, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, N.S. 1243, 1244 (1968).
61 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J.

ECON. HIST. 16, 22-23 (1973) (observing that such an “incongruity between ownership
opportunities” can create problematic incentives); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons,
Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY LAW 35, 37-38 & n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011)
(noting that the abutment of ownership forms generates tragedy, and citing literature
on this point).
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nonowners.

2. The Boundaries of the Home
The home can be understood as a special case of the same
boundary-drawing exercises that have featured in the analysis of firms
and landholdings. What should go inside and outside of the spatial,
temporal, and conceptual package known as a home depends on the
63

scale of the underlying activities—the set of “residential services”

that

property rights deliver to households.
Spatial scale in the residential context is trickier than it appears.
How much space a given household finds necessary for its well-being
64

depends on the cultural context

and on which activities are contained

within the household, as opposed to being socialized within a larger
community or procured privately outside the home. As the “home”
sphere shrinks—at the limit, to the size of a sleeping pod—more and
65

more functions are pushed to the outside.

Conversely, larger homes

may draw within their compass amenities like swimming pools, libraries,
62 When multiple activities are pursued simultaneously at different scales, the problem

of managing mixed property becomes quite complex, and may require measures
designed to counter strategic misbehavior. See generally Henry E. Smith, Semicommon
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000)
(examining these points in the context of medieval common fields that were used both
for private farming and for common grazing).
63 I am analogizing here to the literature on “ecosystem services,” which recognizes
multiple streams of benefits that flow from ecological features.
64 For example, the relative size and quality of one’s home may matter more to one’s
well-being than its absolute size and quality. See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER
10 (1999).
65 As this example suggests, there may be nested layers of “outside,” such as the
common areas in hotels, condominiums, and private residential communities that are
shared by insiders but that exclude outsiders. Similarly, a large private home may
contain many spaces within it that by agreement or convention will be largely under
the control of a subset of the household, or even a single member.
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and observatories that are more commonly shared with people outside
the household.
Consider, for example, cohousing communities in which some of
the functions commonly associated with the individual dwelling unit—
cooking, eating, and relaxing with friends and family—are performed in
common kitchens and socialization spaces.

66

Likewise, dormitory

rooms might be made intentionally small to encourage students to use
common study rooms and socializing areas. Shared bathrooms located
outside the residential unit can be found in many places as well, from
67

Beijing hutongs to the Lawn residences at the University of Virginia.

Exterior portions of the home, from private backyards to front porches,
bring functions within the boundary of the private owner’s holding that
might instead be pursued in public parks or town squares.
Privately provided substitutes for certain functions of the home also
abound. Storage spaces outside of the home, from off-site garages to safe
deposit boxes to rented storage units, can reduce the amount of space
within the home that is devoted to archiving and preserving one’s goods.
Private gyms provide exercise and bathing facilities, and restaurants and
bars offer food and beverage services outside the home. Private
entertainments outside the home can substitute for those in the home.

66 See Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and Design: Cohousing and the

Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3, 11-12
(1999) (describing cohousing “common houses” which typically include kitchen and
dining areas, workshops, meeting rooms, and playroom, and thus “provide not only
extra rooms that are either left out of or reduced in size in the individual dwellings,
but also facilities that will attract activities shared by the entire community.”).
67 See Liu Chang, Bathrooms for Hutong Dwellers Planned, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 5,
2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/05/content_359010.htm;
Living on the Lawn FAQs, U. VA. OFF. DEANS STUDENTS, http://www.virginia.edu/
deanofstudents/lawnapplication/lawnlifefaqs.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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Laundromats offer washing and drying services that households could
instead provide through the ownership of their own machines. Hotels
and other private sleeping spaces can be procured in the private market
as well. That these private alternatives are rarely pursued in
combinations that make the home superfluous over the long run does not
undercut the essential mutability of the home’s space requirements,
though it may shed light on what are thought to be the home’s core
functions.
Another input to the home’s physical size is household size, which
is itself endogenous to the joint production tasks that will be
68

accomplished inside the home.

Because not all of these activities will

be optimally conducted at the same scale, some judgment must be made
about which ones are the most important (or most costly to address if
mis-scaled). Arriving at the right answer to the “household size”
question, for example, depends on the relative importance of those
household products for which economies of scale are important, like
space, heat, shelter, and meals, and those products, such as privacy,
autonomy, and intimacy, for which there tend to be diseconomies of
69

scale.

An important limitation is the fact that housing is cumbersome
70

to resize.

Because it is not easy to add or subtract rooms, homes may

68 ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 76-84; Ellickson, supra note 7, at 287-92.
69 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 7, at 260, 287-92 (“Boosting the number of household

occupants, for example, may reduce the per capita costs of providing goods and
services such as heating, informal social insurance, and food. On the other hand,
adding occupants may give rise to countervailing inefficiencies of scale, such as
greater difficulty in governing behavior within the home.”) (footnote omitted);
O’FLAHERTY, supra note 37, at 348-49 (comparing houses to “miniature cities” and
examining tradeoffs between economies of scale in housing and concerns about
congestion, security, coordination, and privacy).
70 This rigidity is to some extent endogenous to existing social and legal arrangements.
The key to making housing more flexible over time is the ability to subdivide or
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often have excess capacity in order to accommodate peak loads, such as
times when all children are at home, or when guests visit.
Similar points might be made about temporal scale. Brief slices of
possession can produce the basic goods of shelter and sleep, as
evidenced by the fact that transient rights in hotel rooms, shelter beds, or
friends’ couches can serve as substitutes in this domain. But larger
temporal scales are necessary to internalize the costs and benefits of
running a household, raising a family, contributing to a community, or
71

getting a return on one’s investment in housing.

If some functions that

homes perform require longer temporal scales than others, then keeping
those functions within the home will push outward the time envelope.
Optimal temporal scale will be different for different households, and for
the same household under different circumstances.

72

The enduring

reaggregate living spaces within the same building or on the same lot. Zoning
restrictions that do not permit accessory dwelling units present an impediment to this
approach. For some proposed approaches to housing that would incorporate multiple
accessory dwelling units, see Kelsey Keith, Architects Rethinking Housing for the 21st
Century, CURBED (Nov. 17, 2011), http://ny.curbed.com/archives/2011/11/17/architects_
rethinking_housing_for_the_21st_century_city.php.
71 There may, however, be ways to produce these larger scale effects in ways other than
through long-term possession of the same home. For example, derivative instruments
indexed to housing markets could allow people to invest in housing without the
investment being concentrated in one’s own personal home, and such investments
could obviously be held for a shorter or longer time than one chooses to possess any
particular structure. Likewise, investment in a community could be facilitated by
moves within the same neighborhood, where the array of housing stock makes this
feasible. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 139
(1961) (noting the ability of diverse city neighborhoods to accommodate changes in
circumstances and thus allow people to “stay put” over time).
72 We might assume that housing utility generally grows (or shrinks) in discontinuous
ways as a function of time in place, as people become attached to (or tired of) a place.
Because a wide range of personal and often subjective factors determine the utility
associated with staying or leaving at a given temporal point, the occupiers of
residential housing are likely to place high value on having control over when to cut
short (or avoid having cut short) their possessory interest.
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nature of many property interests in housing can be understood as
embodying

a

presumption

that

possession

today

is

strongly

complementary with possession tomorrow—and next week and next
month and next year. This saves the household from having to
renegotiate possession every day or every week, but it also means that
the household may end up with scraps of possessory time that it cannot
use but that are too costly to alienate.
Complementarities also come into play where use rights and quality
standards are involved. For example, a residential use might be
complementary with an in-home occupation like dog training. This
complementarity

might

conflict,

however,

with

other

highly

complementary rights over noise levels throughout the neighborhood
(one loud kennel could disrupt the whole neighborhood). Likewise, a
group of well-kept homes in proximity to each other will enjoy
reciprocal gains that would not be available to any of them if they were
scattered among other uses.
Land use controls attempt to capture positive externalities and
control negative externalities within neighborhoods or zones largely by
limiting uses, but sometimes also by mandating quality (as where
particular lawn care standards are specified within private communities).
These restrictions allow individual households to own less land than if
they had to buffer themselves and their neighbors from spillovers, and
can enable the production of local public goods like a residential
community

with

a

particular

aesthetic

ambience.

But

these

complementarities are not the only ones that must be considered.
Creating spatial proximity among one set of uses (such as high-end
residential homes) may interfere with the benefits of mixing business
and residential uses, or of achieving economic integration among

Property in Housing

61

residences, and thereby avoiding negative synergies associated with
concentrated poverty.
B. Excess Capacity, Sharing, and Procuring
As the discussion above suggests, boundaries around the home may
be drawn in ways that produce greater or lesser amounts of excess
capacity in various domains. A large private backyard might be used just
a few hours each week, a spare bedroom might be used a dozen days a
year, and a kitchen oven might stand idle for days or even weeks. Some
of the most basic residential services that a home provides, such as a
place for human beings to eat, sleep, and be sheltered from the elements,
may go unused for stretches of time while the home’s occupants are
away at work or on vacation. Because these forms of excess capacity fall
within the envelope of private ownership, outsiders cannot (usually)
access the capacity without engaging in a transaction with the owner.
Although such transactions do occur at times, and may have become
more prevalent (or at least more visible) as a result of new technologies,
73

they are often prohibitively costly.

Selling off slices of excess capacity (time inside my house during
the day, for example) may also be inconsistent to a greater or lesser
extent with other residential services that the home provides. For
example, even when its occupants are away, the home continues to serve
as a staging area for the temporarily suspended residential activities,

73 See, e.g., Penelope Green, Surfing the World Wide Couch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007),

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/garden/20couch.html (describing a social
networking site that matches guests with hosts who have spare couches). For
discussion of how excess capacity can be addressed through sharing in some contexts,
see Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
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allowing them to be seamlessly resumed upon the household’s return.
The home serves as a continuous and exclusive storage and display unit
as well, a place where sensitive items like pets, plants, artwork, and
antiques can be maintained in appropriate conditions. It is a shell that
can be policed from the outside in ways that make internal monitoring
74

for theft and other forms of interference largely unnecessary.

Excess

capacity also translates into option value; a bathtub or a washing
machine may be used relatively few hours per week, but it stands ready
75

to be used whenever a household member wants to use it.

If excess household capacity is too difficult to transact over,
whether because of the ways in which it intersects with capacity that is
being actively used or for other reasons, it will stand idle. This result
may be perfectly efficient; there may be no alternative arrangement that
76

can deliver more value, given the costs of achieving it.

Drawing the

boundary lines more tightly can reduce the amount of excess capacity,
but at the cost of producing a converse difficulty: spells of inadequate
capacity that must be met through outsourcing transactions. For example,
a household whose home lacks a spare bedroom may need to arrange for
out-of-town guests to stay at a local hotel, and a household whose living
spaces are too small for a party that it wishes to throw must secure an
off-site party venue.
As these examples suggest, demand for capacity is not exogenously
given but may instead depend on capacity levels themselves. Thus, a
74 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1327-28.
75 I thank Scott Baker for discussions on this point.
76 Cf. Peter Iliev & Ivo Welch, A Model of Operational Slack: The Short-Run, Medium-

Run, and Long-Run Consequences of Limited Attention Capacity, 29 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 2, 3 (2013) (discussing instances in which periods of idleness can be an “optimal
design outcome” given the need to respond quickly during peak activity periods).
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family whose home cannot hold a large party may decide not to hold the
party at all, and a household without a spare bedroom may find that outof-town guests express less interest in visiting. Similarly, the family that
gives up a backyard may lose its interest in spending time outdoors when
this will require a trek to the local park. In some instances, the home’s
excess capacity can be viewed as a form of precommitment to desired
77

expenditures that will be too painful to bear at the margin.

The ability

to precommit to large blocks of service outside of the home (gym
memberships, for example) can serve a similar precommitment
78

function—or can at least attempt to do so.

In other cases it may simply

be efficient to excise certain functions from the home and not to replace
them outside the home, if the loss is less than the cost of including them
or procuring them separately.
Sharing arrangements can attempt to address the twin problems of
excess capacity and inadequate capacity by expanding the pool of users
who are entitled to access the resource. Sharing commonly occurs
among household members, and expanding the household increases
opportunities for sharing. Other alternatives would include easing access
79

for favored guests to share goods within private homes,

or forming

77 Sometimes this difficulty can surmounted through clever forms of mental accounting.

See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 20 (1998) (relating the story
of a couple that chose a less expensive apartment over one with closer access to good
restaurants on the theory that the lower rent would more than pay for taxi rides to
good restaurants, and who then set aside earmarked money for this purpose to ensure
that the marginal cost of transportation would not derail their plans).
78 Such efforts may not turn out to be as effective as envisioned. See Stefano DellaVigna
& Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694 (2006)
(finding that consumers who selected a monthly gym membership paid significantly
more per visit than they would have paid on a pay-per-visit basis).
79 New technologies may make this more feasible, although it is unclear how far the

64

《中研院法學期刊》第12期（2013年3月）

larger clubs (such as private residential communities) for sharing goods
outside the home. These arrangements cut down on excess capacity and
on the need for formal transactions to transfer resources, but can
introduce incentive difficulties of their own.
C. Abutments between Privately and Commonly Owned Elements
For the reasons just suggested, a smaller compass for the individual
home may correspond to an enlarged common or public sphere in which
80

access to resources is shared with those outside the household.

This is

because many of the substitutes for home-produced services like
recreation exhibit jointness of supply: they are too large for any one
person to procure on her own. Thus, households may avoid the costs
associated with excess capacity in backyard space by forgoing the yard
and spending time at a public park, where the shared atmosphere is
81

governed by park rules rather than exclusionary rights.

Even when

goods like recreation or access to open space are procured privately in
settings (like private clubs) from which outsiders can be excluded, the
access must be allocated among the insiders in some fashion. It is

approach can be pushed. For instance, CLOO is a smartphone app that helps a user
find a restroom in a private dwelling that she can use for a small fee, following a realtime request that can be accepted or rejected. See Get a CLOO? App Will Rent Your
Bathroom to Strangers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
technology/2011/09/cloo-app-bathroom.html.
80 Conversely, a larger compass for the individual home may mean less sharing with
outsiders, but could potentially mean more sharing with other household members
within the home (to the extent household size correlates positively with the size and
scope of the home). Even if more household members are not added when the home
takes on more functions, there may be a greater need for household employees or for
other parties who enter the home to keep all of the amenities and facilities functional.
This introduces internal management issues analogous to those found in the firm
setting.
81 See Smith, supra note 54 (discussing exclusion and governance strategies).
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certainly possible to propertize certain aspects of these shared goods, but
important aspects of these goods will usually remain unpriced, and
hence in a commons (as to the insiders). For example, campers in a state
park may obtain possessory rights to a particular campsite while sharing
access to hiking trails and bodies of water.
This abutment between privately owned and commonly owned
elements can produce misaligned incentives, as Hardin’s herdsman story
illustrates. Yet it is impossible to avoid drawing the line between private
and common elements somewhere. Even households that bring the
widest imaginable set of functions within the envelope of the home still
use roads, other sorts of infrastructure, and larger environments in
common with others. Thus, a common resource (such as a road) may be
overused as an input into a private consumption stream (such as that
provided by a secluded homesite), just as a common field may be
overused as an input into a privately owned cow.
There are a variety of ways to address such incentive misalignments.
For example, instead of leaving the siting choice for the home inside the
owners’ package of rights, it might be subjected to a public
decisonmaking process.

82

Alternatively, fees might be charged to

homeowners that account for the costs associated with their siting
decisions, or homeowners might be required to draw their home’s
boundaries even more broadly so as to privately provide the last stretch
83

of road to the home.

Overdrawing the spatial commons (problematic,

because it raises the costs of achieving agglomeration benefits) has
82 Zoning often accomplishes something like this, by limiting where development is

permitted.
83 Impact fees and requirements that new development occur within private

neighborhoods that maintain their own roads illustrate these possibilities.
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generally been associated with “sprawl” and hence with a particular
aesthetic of residential life. But the basic problem of private impacts on
common elements is not unique to any particular vision of housing or
community. It would also be possible for property owners to demand
more density than is socially efficient if the costs of managing it fell on
84

others.

Another way to frame the problem is to recognize that the package
of residential services that households consume is made up of elements
that are most efficiently produced at different scales and under different
ownership structures. Inputs to residential enjoyment include not only
physical shelter but also relatively unpolluted air and workable
infrastructure connecting homes to jobs and other points of interest—
elements that cannot be provided by individual households on their own.
A useful theory of the home must account for these multiple efficient
scales. Households must make, buy, or otherwise acquire (often through
the political process) all of the strands that make up their residential
experience. Decisions about how to configure the housing bundle is
interdependent with the decisions of other households on these matters,
and on the legal rules that manage the abutments between different
entitlement holders and different ownership types.

84 There may also be a temporal analog to sprawl – the rigidity in physical and social

arrangements that results from granting limitless possessory rights to owners. See T.
Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of
Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (noting, and suggesting
charging for, “the diminution of social flexibility that results from putting immobile
improvements on land”). Although eminent domain can be used to overcome an
owner’s veto power, the costs (political and otherwise) of doing so is high.
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D. Misalignments of Exposure and Control
Although much of what I have said to this point has focused on
questions of physical scale, the rules that govern risks and returns also
play a central role in managing ownership abutments of other types. To
take the simplest example, the landlord-tenant relationship divides the
property entitlement in a way that leaves risks and returns with the
landlord, while granting the tenant a consumption stream associated with
a particular term of occupancy. As scholars have noted, there is moral
hazard on both sides of this relationship, as the landlord will be willing
to sacrifice aspects of the tenant’s consumption stream for higher returns,
while the tenant will seek to maximize her own consumption stream
even when it comes at the expense of the landlord’s investment
85

interest.

Landlord-tenant law, combined with a set of private practices

(like credit screening and security deposits), tries to manage this
abutment

in

ownership

interests,

but

does

so

imperfectly.

Homeownership resolves that source of conflict by consolidating in the
household both the home’s consumption stream and its investment
returns. But it introduces another seam in the ownership structure that
produces new incentive misalignments.
The homeowner’s residential experience and investment returns are
both heavily influenced by factors lying outside of her individual
household’s control.

86

These include conditions in the surrounding

block, neighborhood, community, and in locations further afield that
affect employment, entertainment, and other opportunities. The package

85 See Derek K.Y. Chau, Michael Firth & Bin Srinidhi, Leases with Purchase Options

and Double Moral Hazard, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006).
86 See generally FENNELL, supra note 13.
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of local goods and services that the homeowner receives along with her
residence, which are in turn influenced by the behaviors and preferences
of her co-consumers, will also factor heavily into the value of the
residential services the home provides. The scale at which these effects
are produced is much larger than the maximum efficient scale for a
household’s residential activities, and so it is typically managed by a
collective through some type of governance arrangement, public or
private. In an important sense, then, the neighborhood is a
“semicommons” arrangement in which activities involving the same
resource are undertaken at different scales and under different ownership
87

regimes.

Similarly mixed regimes may exist within the household. For

example, students sharing a group house might occupy individual rooms
for purposes of sleep and study on school nights, while throwing open
the entire house for use as a party site on weekends—but not without
88

potential moral hazard.

These abutments between differently scaled activities are addressed
in various ways. Within the household, informal rules backed by norms
may suffice. At the neighborhood level, other forms of governance

87 See Smith, supra note 62, at 132 (defining the semicommons as a property regime in

which “both common and private uses are important and impact significantly on each
other.”).
88 The group house example given in the text replicates in some respects the medieval
common field arrangement in which owners privately owned and cultivated strips of
farmland but threw the entire area open for grazing during certain seasons. In the
medieval common field context, thin, scattered strips may have helped to “strategy
proof” the arrangement. See Smith, supra note 62. In a group house setting, stable
private rights over relatively large chunks of space (rooms) could invite the offloading
of costs onto others. A system of rotation for private bedrooms or perhaps a strategic
dispersal of prized personal possessions throughout the house prior to each party
could help to approximate the strategic advantages of the scattering arrangement in
common fields. I thank my former Property students for discussions on this point.
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emerge. Zoning, coupled with property taxation, forces minimum
contributions from householders to support local public goods and
services. Not only can zoning ensure that households contribute a
89

minimum share of taxes,

the restraints on density and intensity of use

force residents to contribute in kind to particular local public goods, like
a quiet, spacious, residential neighborhood. These monetary and in-kind
contributions may also be managed through private common interest
community structures, such as homeowners associations.
These land use solutions effectively move the circle of homeowner
control outward; in idealized form, they would produce the equivalent of
a single-owner structure for the commonly held elements, much as oil
90

unitization does.

The fact that homeowners have such a large stake in

their own investment returns makes them highly motivated and vocal
participants in the local political process.

91

These high levels of

homeowner involvement in issues that impact property values has been
92

the cause of both celebration and consternation.

On the positive side,

homeowners with a stake in the community might be expected to do all
they can to make the community as desirable as possible—taking into
account both consumption and investment returns.

93

Although there

may be some misalignments even here (for example, between short89 See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local

Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975).
90 Unitization allows a group of landowners to operate as a single unit in exploiting an

oil or gas reserve and dividing up the proceeds. See generally Gary D. Libecap &
James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United
States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589 (2002).
91 See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).
92 For discussion, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617
(2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001)).
93 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 150; Jan K. Brueckner & Man-Soo Joo, Voting
with Capitalization, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 453 (1991).
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stayers who care more about maximizing investment returns and longtimers who would gladly trade some portion of home value to preserve
certain aspects of the community’s consumption experience that they
94

uniquely value),

most homeowners can get behind policies that will

enhance property values.
There are two problems, however. First, to the extent that
homeowners as a group are highly risk averse, they may systematically
95

avoid policies that have positive expected value but high variance.

The status quo may be suboptimally sticky as a result. Second, strong
forms of neighborhood and community control introduce another
potentially problematic abutment: between the factors contained within
the local circle of control and those that influence many such circles of
control simultaneously. From landfill siting to spatial layout to
affordable housing, the impacts of local decisionmaking can have
repercussions that extend beyond the boundaries of the local
jurisdiction.

96

Here, even risk neutral homeowners would rationally

choose to offload costs on other communities whenever possible.
Reducing the stake that individual homeowners hold in the portion of
investment returns attributable to offsite factors would address both
factors, although not without introducing another player in the
ownership structure who will have her own incentives: the investor who
97

would take on the risk shed by the homeowner.

The problems are complex ones that have been explored in greater

94 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 150; Brueckner & Joo, supra note 93, at 464.
95 See FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 9-11.
96 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan

Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1132-44, 1149-50 (1996).
97 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 1098-1109.

Property in Housing

71

depth elsewhere. What the analysis here adds is a sensitivity to the
places where one form of ownership meets another, or one entitlement
holder’s interests run into those of other entitlement holders. These
inevitable abutments can never be eliminated, but only managed. Doing
so intelligently requires a great deal of careful thought about how
residential life might be organized and how its component parts might be
produced and distributed.

Conclusion
For all the attention that housing policy and the law and economics
of property have separately received, a gulf has remained between them.
In this essay, I have tried to make a start at bringing these areas together
by thinking in an open-ended way about how property rights in housing
might be configured. Applying boundary placement principles
developed in other contexts can help to determine the efficient scope of
the home. As a prerequisite, however, we must determine what jobs we
want housing to do for us. Ultimately, answers to the question “how will
housing be configured?” neither emanate entirely from top-down
processes, nor grow entirely from the bottom up, but rather depend on a
complex interaction between law, markets, and behavior. Although this
essay has only scratched the surface in thinking about these interactions,
I hope that it will prompt new thinking along these lines.
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